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Re-examining Public Policy—
a Case for Conditional Fees
in Singapore?
Gary Chan Kok Yew* 
Abstract Conditional fee agreements are currently prohibited in
Singapore. The Singapore courts still adhere to the public policy con-
siderations expressed in the English common law which proscribe
maintenance and champerty. However, the United Kingdom as well as
Ontario (Canada) and Australia have recently ‘departed’ from the old
system prohibiting conditional fee agreements. It is thus timely for
Singapore to re-examine the public policy arguments against con-
ditional fee agreements and inquire whether a conditional fee based
system ought to be introduced. Apart from the above jurisdictions,
lessons will also be drawn from the problems and issues faced by the US
and the rest of Canada in the implementation of conditional fees.
I. Introduction
There has been a flurry of activity and debate in recent years in the
United Kingdom, Australia, Ontario (Canada) and several Common-
wealth states relating to the ubiquitous issue of ‘lawyers’ fees’: should
conditional fee agreements between lawyers and their clients be per-
mitted and, if so, to what extent? The United Kingdom has recently
enacted the Access to Justice Act 1999 and implemented accompany-
ing regulations and orders to expand further the scope of its existing
conditional fee based system. Several Australian States have passed
relevant legislation and issued Law Commission reports on this topic.
Academics and practitioners have urged New Zealand1 to permit con-
ditional fee agreements. South Africa has recently enacted the Condi-
tional Fees Act of 1997 to allow conditional fees with respect to
* Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. I would like to
thank Professor Andrew Phang, Singapore Management University and Professor
Tan Yock Lin, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore for their most
valuable and insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. All errors,
however, remain mine. I am also grateful to the Wharton-SMU Research Centre
(Singapore Management University) for funding this project.
1 See Law Commission, New Zealand, Subsidising Litigation, Preliminary Paper 43
(December 2000); S. Zindel, ‘The Case for Contingency Fees’ (1996) NZLJ 295;
D. Webb, Ethics, Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer (Butterworths:
Wellington, 2000) section 12.5; and K. Tokeley, ‘Taking A Chance: A Proposal for
Contingency Fees’ (1998) 28 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 13.
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personal injury claims. Ontario, for some time the sole remaining
Province in Canada prohibiting conditional fees, has recently passed
the Justice Statute Law Amendment Act 20022 to permit contingency
fee agreements. Relatively speaking, the United States3 and the rest of
Canada4 are ‘veterans’ in this area of conditional fees.
In contrast, it is relatively quiet on the Singapore front in so far as
the issue of conditional fees is concerned. Apart from the few queries
from Members of Parliament and ministerial replies, members of the
public have generally been fairly reticent on this issue of conditional
fees. The Law Society of Singapore had embarked on a study of con-
ditional fees5 but there has not been any public consultation. There
have been few academic writings6 on the issue of conditional fees per
se in Singapore, though there are other related articles on legal aid7
and champertous contracts.8
Yet, the fact is that the Singapore public is not unconcerned about
costs, including legal costs.9 There have been numerous press reports
on rising legal costs in Singapore and the related concerns that they
may be out of the reach of ordinary Singaporeans.10 Even concerns
over the rise of legal fees in the United Kingdom have found their way
2 Royal Assent was received on 9 December 2002.
3 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct rule 1.5(d) (1983); and Model Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 5–103 (1980). For a brief history of the US
development in contingency fees since the nineteenth century, see W.K. Davis,
‘The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why Is The United States
The “Odd Man Out” in How It Pays Its Lawyers?’ (1999) Ariz J Int’l & Comp L 361
at 375.
4 See J.J. Barcello III & R.C. Cramton (eds), Lawyers’ Practice and Ideals: A
Comparative View (Kluwer Law International: Boston, Mass., 1999).
5 See ‘No win, no fee legal system being studied here’, The Straits Times (1 May
1995). It was reported that the Law Society of Singapore wanted to look at the
implementation of conditional fees in the UK and the problems involved before
deciding whether a change was needed here. This writer has been informed that
the Law Society of Singapore had subsequently decided against endorsing
conditional fees in Singapore pursuant to a dialogue session with its members.
The precise reasons for the decision are not known to the writer.
6 See e.g. H.B. Low, ‘Conditional Fee—Expedient Access to Justice?’ [1982] 2
Malayan Law Journal iv; for a Malaysian perspective, see J.C.Y. Loh, ‘Ambulance
Chasing and Contingency Fees in the Honourable Legal Profession: A Plea’ [1972]
2 Malayan Law Journal lx.
7 K.E. Hilborne, ‘The Quality of Legal Aid in Singapore’ [1969] 2 Malayan Law
Journal xlii; H.Y. Yeo, ‘Provision of Legal Aid in Singapore’, in K. Tan (ed.), The
Singapore Legal System (Singapore University Press: Singapore, 1999) 446–66;
H.Y. Yeo, ‘Civil Legal Aid in Singapore’ (1992) 41 ICLQ 875.
8 Y.L. Tan, ‘Champertous Contracts and Assignments’ (1990) 106 LQR 656; Y.L. Tan,
‘Common Interest as Justification for Maintenance’ (1988) 9 Sing LR 191; Y.L. Tan,
The Law of Advocates and Solicitors in Singapore and West Malaysia
(Butterworths Asia: Singapore, 1998) 255–64.
9 See e.g. ‘Rising Costs of Justice’, The Straits Times (27 November 1994). See also
Singapore Parliamentary Reports, vol. 71, col. 1285 (6 March 2000): enquiries
relating to legal aid and disputes ranked amongst the top eight concerns of
Singaporeans (including enquiries relating to job matching, family matters,
financial assistance, training schemes and so on) based on the number of calls
made to the Community Development Council (CDC) National Helpline between
3 January 1998 and the end of 1999.
10 See ‘Rising Costs of Justice’, above n. 9.
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into the local newspapers.11 Several Members of Parliament have
spoken out in favour of relaxing the means test under the current legal
aid system in Singapore.12 Some public-spirited lawyers have volun-
tarily offered their time to provide free legal advice.13 The Chief Jus-
tice of Singapore has publicly expressed his concerns on rising legal
costs in Singapore.14 More recently, the fixed scale costs for convey-
ancing fees have been abolished in Singapore15 after years of public
debate, consultation and press coverage.16
With this background in mind, this writer hopes to assess whether
it would be feasible to introduce conditional fees to address the issue
of litigation costs in Singapore. This writer will discuss how the legal
developments in the United States, Canada, United Kingdom and
Australia can contribute to the debate on the issue of conditional fees
in Singapore. More specifically, the issue of whether a conditional fee
based system (or any appropriate variant thereof) ought to be in-
troduced in Singapore will be examined.
The three main models of conditional fee agreements which have
been identified are as follows:17
1. where the lawyer accepts the client's normal fee only if the
action was successful (a ‘speculative action’ or a ‘conditional
normal fee’ agreement);
2. where the lawyer accepts the client’s normal fee with an agreed
uplift amount in the event of success so as to compensate the
lawyer for the risks of not being paid in the event of failure (a
‘conditional uplift fee’ agreement); and
3. where the lawyer retains an agreed percentage of the client's
recovery, and is paid nothing if the action is unsuccessful, to
11 See ‘Outrage over British QCs’ high fees’, The Straits Times (7 June 1998); see also
‘Top British judge attacks exorbitant lawyers’ fees’, The Straits Times (5 June
2002).
12 See Singapore Parliamentary Reports, vol. 73, cols. 520–3 and 526–7 (9 March
2001).
13 See ‘Lawyers dish out legal advice at CC—for free’, The Straits Times (14 February
2002).
14 Singapore lawyers will probably not forget the example given by the Honourable
Chief Justice of a law firm which had filed a bundle of documents containing
more than 2,000 pages for a hearing for which the filing fees amounted to
S$19,000, which is an extravagant sum by Singapore standards. To top it all, not a
single page of the bundle was cited by counsel during his submission before the
court; see ‘CJ to errant lawyers: Shape up or pay up’, The Straits Times (5 January
2003).
15 The Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Remuneration) Order 2003 (S. 2003/40) which
came into force on 1 February 2003.
16 See ‘Fixed scale for charges kept to protect people’, The Straits Times
(10 November 1995).
17 See D. Luban, ‘Speculating on Justice: The Ethics of Jurisprudence of Conditional
Fees’ in ch. 5 of S. Parker and C. Sampford (eds), Legal Ethics and Legal Practice:
Contemporary Issues (Clarendon Press: New York, 1995).
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compensate for the risks of not being paid in the event of failure
(the American model or the ‘percentage contingency fee’).18
In this paper, each of the above agreements will be referred to broadly
as ‘conditional fee agreements’ since the payment of lawyers’ fees is
conditional upon the outcome of the litigation in each case. The
United Kingdom and Australia currently allow models 1 and 2 con-
ditional fee agreements (subject to specified legislative requirements),
but not model 3 contingency fee agreements. The model 3 ‘contin-
gency fee agreement’, a species of the more general category of ‘con-
ditional fee agreements’, is practised in the United States and
Canada.
The current law in Singapore prohibiting conditional fees forms
part of the English common law which has been imported into Singa-
pore.19 With the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council in 1994,20 the
Singapore Court of Appeal became the highest court of the land and
is no longer, strictly speaking, bound by decisions emanating from the
Privy Council sitting in London.21 However, in practice, as it strives to
develop its autochthonous system, it continues to regard English and
Australian court decisions as well as, to a lesser extent, the United
States and Canadian court decisions, in areas untouched by local
legislation, as persuasive precedents.
The Singapore courts continue—in the context of conditional fee
agreements—to adhere to the public policy considerations expressed
in the English common law which proscribe maintenance and champ-
erty. As Singapore proceeds to develop her own unique legal system,
it may be anomalous for her to continue to endorse such common law
principles, unless this is supported by public policy considerations
which take into account Singapore’s own interests. Hence, it is par-
ticularly timely for Singapore to re-examine the public policy argu-
ments against conditional fee agreements, just as the United
Kingdom, Ontario and Australia have ‘departed’ from the old system
prohibiting conditional fee agreements. Apart from these jurisdic-
tions, lessons may also be drawn from the problems and issues faced
by the US and the rest of Canada in the implementation of conditional
fees.
18 See Lau Liat Meng v Disciplinary Committee [1967] 2 Malayan Law Journal 141
(Privy Council decision on appeal from Singapore) and Re Chan Chow Wang
[1982–83] SLR 413.
19 Application of English Law Act, s. 3; see generally W. Woon, ‘The Applicability of
English Law in Singapore’ in Tan (ed.), above n. 7 at 230–48.
20 The Judicial Committee Repeal Act 1994 (No. 2 of 1994).
21 See also the Practice Statement on Judicial Precedent [1994] 2 SLR 689. This states
that whilst the decisions of the Privy Council are not binding on the Singapore
Court of Appeal, the latter will continue to treat prior decisions of the Privy
Council as ‘normally binding’. Whilst the Singapore Court of Appeal will have the
right to depart from such prior decisions, this power will be exercised ‘sparingly’;
see the local case of PP v Manogaran s/o R Ramu [1997] 1 SLR 22 where the
Singapore Court of Appeal departed from its own previous decision in Abdul
Rahman bin Yusof v PP [1996] 3 SLR 15.
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II. The Public Policy Arguments for Conditional Fees in
Singapore
The prohibitions against conditional fee agreements, maintenance
and champerty in Singapore in respect of contentious proceedings22
are encapsulated in both statutory and common law. The statutory
law in fact preserves and reinforces the common law position in
Singapore. Under section 107(1)(b) of the Singapore Legal Profession
Act,23 no solicitor shall enter into any agreement by which he is re-
tained or employed to prosecute any suit or action or other contentious
proceeding which stipulates for or contemplates payment only in the
event of success in that suit, act or proceeding. Further, section 107(3)
of the Act provides that a solicitor shall, notwithstanding any provi-
sion of the Act, be subject to the law of maintenance and champerty
like any other person.
Though criminal and tortious liability based on maintenance and
champerty have since been abolished in England, any rule prohibiting
champertous contracts on the basis that they are contrary to public
policy and/or otherwise illegal has been preserved.24 The English
courts have generally held that conditional fee agreements (being
champertous agreements) are void and unenforceable.25 The histor-
ically ‘strong anti-professional attitude’26 in the United States may
have given rise to the perception that the practice of law was a com-
mercial endeavour which made contingency fees more acceptable
there, unlike the more purist attitudes adopted in England towards
the professionalism of barristers. The English courts have observed
that a lawyer with a direct financial stake in the action is more likely to
compromise the client’s interests.27 There was a concern that the law-
yer may be tempted to subvert his duties to the court by, for example,
suppressing evidence to gain an unfair advantage in litigation,28 and
in the process adversely affect the due administration of justice.29 As
such, frivolous or vexatious litigation might be encouraged and the
22 There are no similar prohibitions in Singapore against conditional fee agreements
made in the context of non-contentious proceedings: see the Legal Profession
(Solicitors’ Remuneration) Order 2003 (S. 2003/40).
23 Cap. 161, 2001 Rev. Ed.
24 English Criminal Law Act 1967, s. 14(2).
25 In Wallersteiner v Moir (No. 2) [1975] 1 QB 373, Lord Denning stated plainly that
‘English law has never sanctioned an agreement by which a lawyer is
remunerated on the basis of a “contingency fee”, that is that he gets paid the fee if
he wins, but not if he loses. Such an agreement was illegal on the ground that it
was the offence of champerty’. See also Lord Denning in Trendtex Trading Corp v
Credit Suisse [1980] 3 All ER 721.
26 See A.F. Mackinnon, Contingency Fees (American Bar Foundation, 1964) 14–15.
27 As Buckley LJ in Wallersteiner v Moir (No. 2) [1975] QB 373 at 402 had indicated,
an advocate should provide a client with ‘a clear eye and an unbiased judgment’
(emphasis added).
28 Re Trepca Mines (No. 2) [1963] Ch 199 at 219–20, per Lord Denning MR.
29 Thai Trading Co (a firm) v Taylor [1998] 3 All ER 65 at 71, per Millet LJ.
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interests of the opposing party unduly prejudiced.30 Against the tide
of public policy prohibitions of conditional fees and champerty, how-
ever, the English Court of Appeal held in Thai Trading Co (a firm) v
Taylor that it was not improper for a solicitor to agree to act on the
basis that he is to be paid his ordinary costs if he wins but not if he
loses.31 However, this was promptly rejected in the subsequent case of
Awwad v Geraghty & Co (a firm).32 The court ruled that such fee
agreements,33 in circumstances not sanctioned by statute, are against
public policy and hence unenforceable. This English common law
position has, however, been overtaken in the UK by legal reforms
permitting conditional fees via the Courts and Legal Services Act
199034 and its accompanying regulations,35 and this was subsequently
extended via the Access to Justice Act 1999.36
Pursuant to the United Kingdom’s proposals on conditional fees
prior to the enactment of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, a
Member of Parliament raised the issue in the Singapore Parliament as
to whether conditional fees would also be considered for implementa-
tion in Singapore.37 In response, the Minister for Law cited some
objections which have been canvassed against the conditional fee
based system as follows:
1. that there is a danger that lawyers are anxious to get their
remuneration as quickly as possible;
2. that the introduction of a conditional fees system may result in
more litigation which overloads the system; and
3. that unscrupulous lawyers may be tempted to cut deals behind
the scenes in order to get their cut quickly (citing an article in
the Straits Times which quoted the then Lord Chancellor of the
United Kingdom).38
At the same time, the Minister for Law, whilst not excluding the
possibility of changes in this area, suggested that he would like to
30 Lord Mustill in Giles v Thompson [1993] 2 WLR 908 at 911 indicated that
champerty could also result in ‘exploitation of worthless claims which the
defendant lacked the resources and influence to withstand’ (emphasis added).
31 See Millet LJ’s judgment, above n. 29 at 72 (emphasis added).
32 [2000] 1 All ER 608.
33 The fee agreement in question was entered into in 1993, prior to the introduction
of the conditional fee based system in the United Kingdom in 1995.
34 Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, s. 58.
35 Conditional Fees Agreements Order 1995 (SI 1674/1995), and Conditional Fees
Agreements Regulations (SI 1675/1995).
36 Access to Justice Act 1999, ss. 27 and 28 replaced the Courts and Legal Services
Act 1990, s. 58 with a new s. 58 and added ss. 58A and 58B.
37 The Member of Parliament also asked a related question whether the Official
Assignee should be empowered to employ professionals to conduct investigations
to pursue debtors on a contingency fee basis: see Singapore Parliamentary
Reports, vol. 53, cols. 851–2 (27 March 1989).
38 Singapore Parliamentary Reports, vol. 53, cols. 856–7 (27 March 1989). It was not
entirely clear whether the Minister for Law, in raising the objections, was
targeting the American-style contingency fees, the United Kingdom proposals for
a limited form of conditional fees, or both.
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tread ‘cautiously’ and that the matter be debated by lawyers first.39 In
a subsequent Parliamentary debate some 11 years later, another Mem-
ber of Parliament proposed the relaxation of the means test under the
civil legal aid scheme with a view to allowing poorer Singaporeans to
have greater access to justice. The Member of Parliament also com-
mented that poorer Singaporeans are unlike the poorer citizens in the
United States, whom the Member of Parliament said are not similarly
prejudiced because of the contingency fee system there. The Member
of Parliament did not, however, refer to the conditional fee system in
the United Kingdom. In response, the Minister for Law indicated that
to introduce conditional fees in Singapore would be a fundamental
change to the solicitor-client relationship and that a lawyer may be-
come ‘personally and emotionally involved’ in a case where his fees
are dependent on whether he succeeds or not.40
This paper suggests four broad reasons for permitting conditional
fee agreements in Singapore. It will examine public policy reasons
(from a comparative perspective) for the implementation of condi-
tional fees in Singapore and, at the same time, attempts will be made
to address the possible objections to conditional fees. The discussion
will relate to the following concerns:
1. access to justice and the likelihood of increased litigiousness
and frivolous claims;
2. the merits and demerits of the state civil legal aid scheme as an
alternative to conditional fees;
3. the likelihood of the lawyer (acting pursuant to a conditional fee
agreement) to compromise his or her professional duties to the
client and the courts; and
4. the impact of conditional fees on alternative dispute resolution
(particularly mediation and negotiation) in Singapore.
i. Access to Justice, Increased Litigiousness
and Frivolous Claims
Having ‘access to justice’ means that the potential litigant is capable of
vindicating his legal rights within the parameters of the legal system,
whether to initiate or to defend a claim in the courts. It is noted that,
as solicitor-client costs constitute a substantial portion of the entire
legal costs for the potential litigant,41 self-representation could well
save large sums of money. However, the layperson would be hard put
to argue a case effectively before the courts if he or she does not
possess the rudiments of legal knowledge as well as litigation experi-
ence. Moreover, under the Singapore adversarial mode of litigation,
litigants are expected to be able to gather and present evidence, call
39 Ibid.
40 Singapore Parliamentary Reports, vol. 71, col. 1465 (8 March 2000).
41 The total legal costs would consist of party-party costs, solicitor-client costs plus
disbursements (including hearing and other court fees).
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and examine witnesses and be familiar with the rules of evidence and
procedure. The ‘substantive’ capacity and ability of the litigant to
pursue his or her case in the courts is therefore very significant, as far
as the notion of ‘access to justice’ is concerned. There is evidence that
indigent litigants are more likely to be illiterate or poorly educated
compared with the well-off in Singapore42 and hence are less likely to
possess the requisite knowledge to pursue a case in the courts without
the assistance of a lawyer.
Conditional fees, if permitted in Singapore, would allow such in-
digent persons at least the opportunity to litigate based on a condi-
tional fee agreement.43 These persons are likely to consist of those
who do not qualify for legal aid under the stringent criteria contained
in the Legal Aid and Advice Act44 and who also cannot afford lawyers’
fees. The introduction of conditional fees, however, does not neces-
sarily remove the entire costs burden for the potential claimant. Under
the ‘costs follow the event’ principle in Singapore, the losing party in
civil litigation would generally still be required to pay legal costs to the
winning party. This requirement may be obviated, as in the United
Kingdom, if the litigant took up litigation expenses insurance (LEI)
against the risks of having to pay such legal costs to the winning
party.45 If this is the case, his or her financial risks would be further
reduced. However, irrespective of whether he or she purchases such
insurance, the fact remains that the losing party under a conditional
fee agreement need not pay legal fees to his or her own lawyer (and
this usually constitutes substantial ‘savings’ from his or her total legal
expenses). As such, his or her access to justice is enhanced to the
extent that the financial burden to pay his or her own lawyer is oblit-
erated or minimized.
The introduction of conditional fees in Singapore would not only
lead to increased access to justice, but also, and more importantly, to
the ‘equalization’ of access to justice. Conditional fees allow a poor
individual claimant the opportunity to vindicate his or her legal rights
against the big corporation. The US academic Galanter regarded this
as a form of structural imbalance in litigation which favours the ‘re-
peat players’ as opposed to the ‘one-shotters’.46 Conditional fees can
42 See M.K. Ng and Y.L. Yap, Household and Population Statistics Division,
Singapore Department of Statistics, ‘Trends in Household Expenditure and Asset
Ownership 1988–1998’, Statistics Singapore Newsletter (2001) 2–6. The proportion
of persons aged 18 years and above with at least one of the following
investments/assets, insurance policies, credit/charge cards, stocks and shares,
correlated positively with the level of education obtained measured over the
period 1993–98.
43 In addition, it might even be said that conditional fees are likely to afford a litigant
greater liberty in selecting and engaging quality legal representation which he or
she may not otherwise be able to afford under the present regime.
44 Cap. 160, 1996 Rev. Ed.
45 Strictly speaking, conditional fees need not necessarily be tied to LEI.
46 M. Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change’ (1974) 9 Law and Society Rev 95.
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help in restoring this structural imbalance and move towards greater
‘equalization’ of access to justice between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-
nots’. Permitting conditional fee agreements between lawyers and
clients would also remove the ‘barriers to entry’ into the litigation
market of potential litigants with meritorious claims or defences and
hence would ensure a more level playing-field.
It should, however, be noted that legal costs constitute only one
facet to the all-embracing notion of ‘access to justice’. The notion of
‘access to justice’ may be impacted by several other factors such as
the use of information technology to ‘expedite’ access to justice, ex-
tending the jurisdiction of small claims tribunals, efficiency of court
procedures, independence of the courts and the ability to enforce
court judgments, even the degree of reliance on extended family
support to maintain litigation and so on, which are not directly
(though they may be indirectly) related to the use of conditional fee
agreements.
The right of access to justice should be regarded as a significant
right enforceable and recognized in Singapore. The bases of access to
justice in respect of conditional fees have been expressed in case law
precedents, statutes and Law Commission reports in the United King-
dom, United States, Australia and Ontario. For example, Millet LJ in
Thai Trading felt that access to justice is a ‘fundamental human right’
which ought to be readily available to all. Whilst the learned judge
was concerned that lawyers would be tempted by financial incentives
on the outcome of the litigation, he recognized that this would be
outweighed by the countervailing public policy to make justice avail-
able to persons with modest means.47 There was no direct comment in
Awwad v Geraghty on Millet LJ’s pronouncement of access to justice
as a ‘fundamental human right’, although Schiemann LJ did recognize
the public policy basis, amongst others, of greater access to the courts
by members of the public.48 In Gore v Justice Corp Pty Ltd, the Full
Court of the Federal Court of Australia stated that with the high costs
of litigation, there are ‘risks that citizens with justifiable causes of
action may be kept out of courts because of their inability to pay the
costs of litigation or because they fear the financial risks of litiga-
tion’.49 The Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional
Affairs in New South Wales, Australia has echoed similar sentiments
that ‘the high cost of justice in Australia has resulted in the legal
system being inaccessible to sections of the community’.50 Taking a
similar line, the Canadian courts have also emphasized the need to
47 [1998] 3 All ER 65 at 73.
48 [2000] 1 All ER 608 at 623.
49 [2002] FCA 354 (also cited in Treacy & Ors v Rylestone Pty Ltd & Ors [2002] WASC
178 (Supreme Court of Western Australia) at para. 58).
50 The Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, Barratry, Maintenance and
Champerty, Discussion Paper 36 (1994) para. 2.16.
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facilitate access to justice through contingency fee agreements.51 The
Ontario Court of Appeal in McIntyre Estate v Ontario52 had also urged
the Ontario government to enact legislation to permit contingency
fees.
Moreover, the English courts have also recognized access to the
courts as a basic constitutional right (derived from the common law)
which can only be abrogated by express provision in an Act of Parlia-
ment.53 The constitutional right to counsel exists in the US to assist
indigent litigants at least for certain types of claims.54
In the Singapore case of Amar Hoseen Mohammed v Singapore
Airlines Ltd, K.S. Rajah JC (as he then was) stated, in the context of a
security for costs application, that ‘courts are slow to whittle away a
natural person’s right to litigate despite poverty. The requirement for
security for costs from a foreigner, a natural person, making on the
face of things a genuine claim against a large airline must not appear
to deny him access to our courts’.55 In the Malaysian case of Sugumar
Balakrishnan v Pengarah Imigresen Negeri Sabah & Anor,56 the court
regarded the liberty of an aggrieved person to seek relief in the courts
as one of the many facets of personal liberty guaranteed under Article
5(1) of the Federal Constitution, which is in pari materia with Article
9(1) of the Singapore Constitution. Article 9(1) provides that no per-
son shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance
with the law. The court specifically referred to the English case of R v
Lord Chancellor, ex p. Witham57 but stated that, unlike the United
Kingdom, as Malaysia has a written constitution, the Malaysian
Parliament is not empowered to limit the constitutional right of access
to the courts.58 Thus, in the context of Singapore which has a written
51 See e.g. Cory J in Coronation Insurance Co v Florence [1994] SCJ No. 116 (para.
14); McIntyre Estate v Ontario [2002] OJ No. 3417, 10 September 2002 (para. 72).
52 [2002] OJ No. 3417, 10 September 2002 (para. 85).
53 See R v Lord Chancellor, ex p. Witham [1997] 2 All ER 779.
54 See e.g. Boddie v Connecticut (1971) 401 US 434; J. Mahoney, ‘Green Forms and
Legal Aid Offices: A History of Publicly Funded Legal Services in Britain and the
United States’ (1998) 17 St Louis U Pub L Rev 223 at 230–1.
55 [1995] 1 SLR 77 (emphasis added). In Pandian Marmuthu v Guan Leong [2001]
3 SLR 400, the Singapore High Court, in deciding an application for security for
costs, took into consideration, inter alia, the fact that it should be circumspect to
ensure that the defendant’s purpose of seeking security for costs is not to quell
the claimant’s quest for justice.
56 [1998] 3 Malayan Law Journal 289. In another Malaysian case, Bank Bumiputra
Malaysia Bhd & Anor v Lorrain Esme Osman [1990] 3 Malayan Law Journal 481,
the defendant obtained a variation of an existing Mareva injunction against him to
allow him to take from his assets urgently needed funds for his legal expenses in
respect of two legal proceedings abroad (a habeas corpus application and a case
before the European Commission of Human Rights) which involved his personal
liberty.
57 Above n. 53.
58 It should be noted that the right to access to justice in the United Kingdom may
be derived from another source, i.e. Art. 6 ECHR which grants a right to a fair
trial (see R v Lord Chancellor, ex p. Witham, above n. 53) and the UK Human
Rights Act 1998.
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constitution, it may be, a fortiori, argued that access to justice is tanta-
mount to a constitutional right or, alternatively, a quasi-constitutional
right.
References can also be made to the notion of ‘access to justice’ in
specific Singapore legislation. The Supreme Court of Judicature Act
imposes an obligation on the High Court to assign an advocate and
solicitor to a person against whom an order under section 74 (that is,
an order preventing legal proceedings or discontinuation thereof by a
vexatious litigant) has been made and who is ‘unable on account of
poverty’ to engage a lawyer.59 Apart from court decisions, references
to the Constitution and legislation, one can also point to statements
from Parliamentarians extolling the need for access to justice. Mem-
bers of Parliament have received feedback from their constituents
indicating the high costs involved in enforcing one’s legal rights60 and
the consequent need to expand access to justice. The Singapore judi-
ciary has also made significant pronouncements, outside of the court-
rooms, on the need for access to justice.61 The Chief Justice has
recently, in his speech to the subordinate courts which handle 95 per
cent of the court cases in Singapore, stated that ‘the Judiciary must
guard against the obstruction to justice, or more accurately, access to
justice. We must strive to ensure that the public, and especially those
who are indigent, can seek the redress available through the judicial
process’.62 Hence, it is submitted that, on balance, access to justice is a
significant right which should outweigh the perceived public policy
reasons against conditional fees. Moreover, as will be seen later, these
perceived public policy reasons are not as persuasive as the older case
law precedents had envisaged.63
The converse argument raised against conditional fees in Singa-
pore is that, in the process of enhancing access to justice, a more
litigious society may result which would be bad for Singapore. The
Minister for Law had raised this issue in Parliament concerning in-
creased litigation which may overload the legal system. There is a
perception that conditional fees would unduly encourage injured vic-
tims to make claims against the defendants, even frivolous and vexa-
tious claims which translate to higher legal costs.
It is submitted, however, that these fears are not persuasive in the
final analysis. First, greater litigiousness in a society per se is not
necessarily an undesirable state of affairs. An increase in litigiousness
59 Supreme Court of Judicature Act, s. 74(2) (Cap. 322, 1999 Rev. Ed.).
60 See Singapore Parliamentary Reports, vol. 74, col. 1205 (15 May 2002).
61 The Chief Justice asked in relation to the 4th Workplan for Subordinate Courts in
1995/96: ‘What then are the Subordinate Courts’ values? The first must surely be
accessibility . . .’: see L.Y. Lim and T.L. Liew, Court Mediation in Singapore (FT Law
and Tax Asia Pacific: Singapore, 1997) 21.
62 ‘Anchoring Justice’, Subordinate Courts’ 12th Workplan 2003/04 (emphasis
added).
63 Indeed, some arguments will be proffered in this Part (see iii below) as the bases
for rejecting the above-mentioned public policy reasons against conditional fees.
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may reflect the fact that more people are availing themselves of the
opportunities to vindicate their legal rights within the parameters of
the legal system. It is clear that attitudes towards litigation differ
between countries, such as the contrast between England and the
United States.64 Looking at the issue from a more ‘universalist’ per-
spective, it cannot be said that increased litigiousness per se is intrin-
sically undesirable.
Secondly, there is no evidence that conditional fees will necessarily
result in a flood of litigation. One may need to look at various other
factors apart from contingency fees for the relatively high litigious-
ness in certain jurisdictions such as the United States (for example,
the lack of a medical insurance scheme and limited welfare).65 Though
this does not preclude contingency fees in the US as a possible con-
tributory factor, it is noted that increased litigation is not the crux of
the problem, but frivolous and vexatious claims. Indeed, it has been
observed in Australia that conditional fees may actually work to filter
out unmeritorious claims as lawyers will not bear the risk in such
cases.66 Further, instead of viewing the conditional fee based system
as one which contributes to the overall costs of a society, one could
regard it as a method whereby the legal risks or costs are spread or
allocated (or sometimes shifted) amongst the client, the lawyer and
the opposing litigant, a form of insurance against legal risks borne by
the client.
Some related issues which Singapore should consider carefully be-
fore any implementation of conditional fees are first, whether the
client under a conditional fee agreement should be backed up by
insurance against the risk of having to pay the legal costs to the
winning party (as in the United Kingdom) and secondly, whether this
would ‘create’, for the potential litigant, a ‘risk-free’ zone such as to
generate unnecessary litigation and costs? A totally ‘risk-free’ zone
for the potential litigant (as referred to by the English court in Callery
v Gray)67 may not be a desirable state of affairs. Indeed, the relevant
question should be as follows: what would be the appropriate amount
of costs which the potential litigant should bear if he or she loses the
case? A proper balance should be struck between the need to enhance
64 M. Zander, Lawyers and the Public Interest: a study in restrictive practices
(Weidenfeld & Nicholson: London, 1968) 115.
65 See G.E. Dal Pont, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility in Australia and New
Zealand (LBC Information Services: North Ryde, NSW, 1996) 308. This writer is
not aware of any concrete evidence of a general and direct correlation between
the level of litigiousness in a society and contingency fees. Note the case of Japan,
which operates a contingency fee system, but has a relatively low number of
lawyers per capita of population: see J.M. Ramseyer and M. Nakazato, Japanese
Law: An Economic Approach (University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London,
1999) 6 and 13.
66 See generally Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A Review of
the Federal Justice System (1999) Part 5, ‘Legal Assistance’.
67 [2002] 3 All ER 417.
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access to justice and the requirement to act responsibly before litigat-
ing. This issue certainly merits further study and is likely to require
more socio-economic data relating to demography, costs of living
including legal costs and litigants’ behaviour in Singapore.
The public policy reason that champerty may lead to ‘exploitation
of worthless claims’ has already been referred to above. However, it is
contended that there is no real danger of an increase in vexatious and
frivolous claims arising from conditional fees. Sufficient safeguards lie
in the power of the court to strike out vexatious and frivolous plead-
ings in accordance with the Rules of Court68 as well as its inherent
jurisdiction to prevent vexatious and frivolous proceedings which
constitute an abuse of the process of the court.69 The High Court also
has a statutory70 right to prevent a vexatious litigant from instituting
any legal proceeding in any court or to require him or her to dis-
continue any pending legal proceedings.
In practical terms, the lawyer is less likely to accept a case based on
a conditional fee agreement where the claim is frivolous or vexatious
with little or no likelihood of success. The lawyer would not relish the
prospect of spending time and effort on a case which is not likely to
derive any monetary benefit. Brickman, for example, refers to the
high success ratios of American contingency fee lawyers in tort cases
as evidence that such lawyers generally accept cases where there is at
least a good prospect for recovery after careful case selection.71
The lawyer is also likely to be deterred from taking up a frivolous
and vexatious claim as he or she may run the risk of having to pay the
other party’s costs and, in addition, forgo solicitor-client costs under
the courts’ wasted costs jurisdiction. Where costs have been incurred
‘unreasonably or improperly’ in any proceedings, the lawyer may be
personally liable for costs.72 A lawyer may be regarded as failing to
act ‘reasonably’ if he pursues a case when it is obvious that there are
no prospects for success.73 In a similar vein, there are local cases
which have held that a non-party may have to pay the opposing party
68 Order 18, r. 19 of the Rules of Court. This power to strike out pleadings will be
exercised in plain and obvious cases; see the Singapore Court of Appeal decision
in The Osprey [2000] 1 SLR 281.
69 See Singapore High Court decision of Chua Choon Lim Robert v MN Swami of
Messrs MN Swami & Yap (Suit No. 223 of 2000: RA No. 4 of 2000) in Jeffrey
Pinsler, Singapore Court Practice 2003 (Lexis Nexis: Singapore, 2003) 102–3.
70 Supreme Court of Judicature Act, s. 74 (Cap. 322, 1999 Rev. Ed.).
71 See L. Brickman, ‘ABA Regulations of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics
Walks’ (1996) 65 Fordham L Rev 247 at 283.
72 Order 59, r. 8 of the Rules of Court. In England, the courts have held that the
lawyer will not be exposed to any greater risk to pay costs personally in a case
where there was a conditional fee agreement as compared with a case under
another fee agreement (see Hodgson and others v Imperial Tobacco Ltd and others
[1998] 1 WLR 1056). See D. Luban, above n. 17 at 102 on the role of the US ‘rule 11
sanctions’ under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in deterring frivolous
claims.
73 See the English case Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Abassi,
The Times (6 April 1992).
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the costs incurred by the latter if the non-party had caused unneces-
sary proceedings or litigious expenses74 or had initiated an unwar-
ranted action.75 The decisions in these cases are not based on wasted
costs jurisdiction.76 Thus, a lawyer acting for a client in respect of a
frivolous and vexatious claim may find himself or herself liable to pay
the opposing party’s costs.
ii. Conditional Fees and Civil Legal Aid
In the United Kingdom, one of the primary reasons for the imple-
mentation of conditional fees is to reduce the government budget for
legal aid so as to be able to channel it to better use. It is recognized
that many of the peculiar problems and circumstances which necess-
itated the legal aid reforms in the United Kingdom may not be entirely
applicable to Singapore.77 The Singapore government, in the financial
year 2002, set aside a relatively small sum (compared with the United
Kingdom) for providing legal aid.78 Nevertheless, it is submitted that
such an amount constitutes potential savings for the government
which can be utilized in more appropriate ways, if the legal aid budget
is reduced.
As indicated earlier, there have been several calls for the Singapore
government to relax the means test to allow more people to be
granted legal aid in Singapore. One problem that the legal aid system
of a country will face, notwithstanding the increase in the legal aid
budget, is that public debate will continue to rage on the insufficiency
of legal aid. The writing is on the wall—the amount of legal aid is
never enough. Even as the Singapore government adjusted the means
test for granting legal aid recently, there have been calls from Mem-
bers of Parliament clamouring for another adjustment,79 barely two
years from the most recent adjustment in 2001.
Under the Legal Aid and Advice Act, the Legal Aid Bureau is em-
powered to administer the means test as well as a merits test to
determine the persons eligible for civil legal aid. To fulfil the means
test under the Legal Aid and Advice Act, the applicant should not
74 See Zainal Abidin Putih v Che Wan Development Sdn Bhd [1992] 2 Malayan Law
Journal 233, Malaysian Supreme Court.
75 See The Karting Club of Singapore v David Mak & Ors (Wee Soon Kim Anthony,
Intervener) [1992] 2 SLR 483, Singapore High Court.
76 Ibid., the court stated that it had an unfettered power under Ord. 59, r. 2(2) of the
Rules of Supreme Court 1970 to determine by whom costs are to be paid.
77 Criticisms have been levelled against the legal aid system in the United Kingdom
(including a lack of supervision over the quality of legal services provided, the
rapid rise in legal aid expenditure and the use of legal aid funds in cases of
insufficient merit): see White Paper, Modernising Justice—The Government’s plans
for reforming legal services and the courts, Cm 4155 (1998) para. 3.8.
78 The total sum of S$3.8 million would amount to just about S$1 per capita of the
population.
79 Singapore Parliamentary Reports, vol. 76, cols. 698–701 (13 March 2003).
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possess nor be entitled to disposable capital exceeding S$7,000 and
disposable income should not exceed S$10,000 per annum.80 The
means test is, however, not linked to economic variables such as basic
wage or costs of living,81 though the Minister is empowered to in-
troduce modifications to the means test, presumably to adapt to
changing conditions (including economic conditions).82 In addition,
the applicant is required to pass the merits test based on the ‘reason-
able’ opinion of the Legal Aid Board.83 There is a wide discretion on
the part of the Director of the Legal Aid Bureau to refuse legal aid if it
appears to him or her ‘unreasonable that the applicant should receive
it in the particular circumstances of the case’.84
It is submitted that the present civil legal aid scheme is not suffi-
ciently ‘sensitive’ to the potential legal costs involved in a particular
case. Where a person who would fail the means test intends to pursue
a meritorious and huge claim against a big corporation and legal
costs are likely to escalate, the strict application of the means test
would prevent him or her from obtaining legal aid. Further, the poten-
tial legal costs would often seriously deter ordinary people (save for
the well-off) from taking out such a claim in the first instance. The
potentially huge legal costs involved should therefore be taken into
account in determining whether a person should be granted legal aid,
and not merely based on a strict application of the means test. Thus,
there is no built-in system currently which necessarily takes into ac-
count the potential legal costs involved in an action in determining the
granting of legal aid. In contrast, unlike the current legal aid system,
the conditional fees lawyer would necessarily take into account, as
part of the exercise of determining the appropriate ‘success fees’, the
potential legal costs involved as well as, assuming an American-style
contingency fee model, the expected amount of damages to be
recovered.
The issue of conditional fees as linked to the sufficiency of state
legal aid was in fact raised in the Singapore Parliament recently. The
Members of Parliament opined that, amongst other reasons, the
means test under the Legal Aid and Advice Act was too stringent and
as a result, there are many people who are unable to afford lawyers
and who could not qualify for legal aid.85 To the credit of the legal aid
80 Legal Aid and Advice Act, s. 8(2) read with sch. 2 (Cap. 160, 1996 Rev. Ed.). The
definitions of ‘disposable capital’ and ‘disposable income’ are contained in sch. 2
which indicates the allowable deductions. The S$10,000 figure for disposable
income was set on 1 April 2001.
81 See Yeo in Tan (ed.), above n. 7 at 455.
82 Legal Aid and Advice Act, s. 24.
83 Ibid., s. 8(2)(a). The Legal Aid Board consists of the Director and at least two
private practitioners (acting as independent members): see ibid., s. 8.
84 Ibid., s. 8(3).
85 Singapore Parliamentary Reports, vol. 71, cols. 1454–7 (8 March 2000).
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scheme, however, the number of persons granted legal aid has in-
creased since the 1 April 2001 revision.86 However, in view of the
rising costs of litigation, there would still be a proportion of people
ineligible for legal aid who would be strongly deterred from either
taking out a claim or defending an action. The fact is that the amount
of costs being awarded to lawyers in Singapore has risen quite dras-
tically in recent years.87 Further, even if the potential litigant is able to
pay the litigation costs, it would wipe out a substantial part of his or
her savings intended for other useful purposes. Litigation costs are
also uncertain: what may be projected or estimated as reasonable
costs to be incurred prior to commencement of an action may turn out
to be grossly underestimated if the matter becomes more contentious
than expected. Moreover, under the present regime, the winning
party would still have to pay the solicitor-client costs which are usu-
ally higher than the party-party costs which would be received from
the losing party.88
A party funded by legal aid has no liability for costs to the other
party89 though costs can be awarded against the unaided party in
favour of the aided person, which costs are then paid to the Legal Aid
Fund maintained by the Legal Aid Bureau.90 This non-reciprocal and
unfair approach under the Legal Aid and Advice Act between the
aided person and the unaided person appears particularly glaring in
the case of a successful unaided defendant who is left to bear his or
her own costs, notwithstanding the fact that the action by the aided
claimant has failed.91 The United Kingdom was saddled with the same
unfortunate predicament prior to its introduction of a conditional fee
based system.92 Under a conditional fee based system, however, this
non-reciprocal approach to legal costs does not exist. According to
the ‘costs follow the event’ principle, the losing party will be required
to pay the party-party costs to the winning party including the
‘success fee’ agreed under the conditional fee agreement between the
winning party and his or her lawyer, since this is what the winning
party has to pay his or her lawyer as part of the solicitor-client costs.
As mentioned above, in the United Kingdom and in certain Australian
86 The Minister for Law revealed the following figures in Parliament: 4,709 persons
in 1999, 4,968 persons in 2000 and 6,571 persons in 2001. From April 1999 to
March 2002, a total of 16,248 persons received legal aid; see Singapore
Parliamentary Reports, vol. 75, cols. 2033–4 (20 January 2003).
87 See ‘CJ to errant lawyers: Shape Up or Pay Up’, above n. 14. It was reported that
the average amount of costs awarded to lawyers from 1995 to August 2001 went
up by 8 times, though the amount has been reduced since then.
88 See the editorial in The Straits Times (25 August 1995), ‘Whither the costs of
justice?’, which discusses the view of a reader as to why, in spite of winning an
appeal with costs, he was ‘left poorer because of his solicitor’s costs’.
89 Legal Aid and Advice Act, s. 12(4)(c).
90 Ibid. s. 16(2).
91 See Yeo in Tan (ed.), above n. 7 at 460; see also Hilborne, above n. 7 at xliv.
92 Callery v Gray [2002] 3 All ER 417 at 419, per Lord Bingham.
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States93 respectively, the losing party could take out litigation ex-
penses insurance against having to pay the winning party’s costs or
seek legal assistance from the government to indemnify him or her
against adverse costs orders in specific circumstances.
Moreover, there is no right of appeal for aggrieved applicants who
have been refused legal aid under the Legal Aid and Advice Act.94 One
solution for the aggrieved applicant would be to apply for judicial
review of the decision of the Legal Aid Bureau. However, that would
merely add undue financial pressure on the applicant if he or she were
genuinely indigent in the first place.95
There is little financial incentive for the private counsel sitting on
legal-aid panels to provide legal aid to indigent persons since the
payments for their services are meagre,96 whether the case is won or
lost. A local writer97 has commented on the poor participation of
private counsel in legal-aid panels. In contrast, the lawyer acting
under a conditional fee agreement for his or her client would have
a more direct financial interest in the success of his or her client’s
case and would enjoy the prospects of obtaining a success fee if he or
she wins the case. The effect of such an incentive cannot be
underestimated.
At present, the Legal Aid and Advice Act does not cover non-
Singaporeans and non-permanent residents. It is submitted that there
are good reasons for marketing and making available our justice sys-
tem98 to foreigners via conditional fee agreements. Singapore’s judi-
cial system should be made accessible to as many people as possible.
It would be a test of the rule of law if Singapore is able to ensure
foreigners with meritorious claims or defences access to justice in our
courts against the defendants (even if they are errant Singaporeans).99
93 See Australian Law Reform Commission, Costs Shifting—Who Pays For Litigation,
Discussion Paper 75 (1995) part 5.
94 This apparent lack was already pointed out more than four decades ago by
Hilborne (see above n. 7 at xliv).
95 See Yeo in Tan (ed.), above n. 7 at 450.
96 Under the Legal Aid and Advice Regulations (Cap. 160, reg. 1, 1990 Ed.), the
solicitor is only entitled to 50 per cent of the taxed amount of solicitor and client
costs. The sum payable to a solicitor investigating and reporting or giving an
opinion upon applications for the grant of legal aid or giving legal advice is a
meagre $50 per hour for work done; see reg. 15.
97 See Yeo in Tan (ed.), above n. 7 at 451.
98 The Singapore judiciary takes pride in maintaining its high ranking in the world
for its efficiency and speed in handling cases; see ‘CJ to errant lawyers: Shape Up
or Pay Up’, above n. 87. It was ranked first in Asia by the Political and Economic
Risks Consultancy (PERC) in respect of a court’s ability to address requirements
of business operations and first in the world by the International Institute for
Management Development for its contribution to the competitiveness of the
economy: see Subordinate Courts Singapore Annual Report 2002 at 59.
99 This would be in line with the Singapore government’s policy of attracting foreign
professionals and workers to Singapore which is based, inter alia, on the need to
enhance foreign direct investment. In 2002, Singapore attracted S$9 billion of
foreign direct investments which are estimated to create 22,000 jobs (of which
15,000 are slated to be taken up by Singaporeans): see Ministry of Manpower
Annual Report 2002 at 60 at http://www.mom.gov.sg.
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Foreigners with meritorious claims or defences should be allowed
access to our courts to vindicate their rights. Such foreigners may
include foreign workers or domestic helpers, who may not have suffi-
cient funds to take out a claim or to defend themselves. However, it
would be contrary to Singapore’s public interest to use public funds of
taxpayers to aid the litigation of foreigners directly. As such, it is
suggested that the conditional fee based system can be utilized by the
foreigners instead to fund the litigation.
It is suggested that the civil legal aid scheme in Singapore should
continue albeit in a more limited role.100 The civil legal aid scheme
should aid those persons who may still be deterred from obtaining
access to justice through the conditional fee based system. In particu-
lar, it should aid persons with meritorious claims or defences who
have engaged a lawyer under a conditional fee agreement, but would
still find it onerous to pay the insurance premiums or the disburse-
ments to the lawyer if they should lose the case. The availability of civil
legal aid is tied to the issue of the scope of the conditional fee based
system and whether it would be desirable for the claimant to operate
in a totally risk-free environment. The decision of the Legal Aid
Bureau to pay such premiums or disbursements on behalf of the aided
person should be limited to the poorest in Singapore, hence reducing
the legal aid budget. In cases where the litigation does not involve
monetary compensation (for example, injunctions) such that condi-
tional fee agreements may not be applicable, the Legal Aid Bureau can
still play a limited but useful role.
Another suggestion is perhaps to merge conditional fees with the
legal aid system, forming a hybrid system of sorts.101 Under such a
‘hybrid’ system, it is suggested the aided litigant be required to pay
into the Legal Aid Fund a portion of the damages recovered or such
other ‘success fees’ (in addition to costs) in the event that he or she
wins the case. If this suggestion is implemented, the means test could
be relaxed so as to aid persons who would not have been eligible
under the current legal aid system. At the same time, such a system
maintains the legal aid budget at an acceptable level with the potential
100 Even if conditional fees were implemented in Singapore, the Legal Aid Bureau
should still continue with the provision of ‘legal advice’ which is not tied to any
means test and is available to persons resident and present in Singapore. ‘Legal
advice’ is defined as ‘oral advice on legal questions’ and ‘shall not include advice
on any law other than the law of Singapore’ (Legal Aid and Advice Act, s. 20).
101 Hong Kong set up a Supplementary Legal Aid Fund in 1984 for personal injury
cases (excluding medical negligence) where the claim exceeds HK$60,000. The
aided persons under the scheme are required to contribute a portion of the
proceeds of litigation. The scheme was funded by a HK$1,000,000 loan facility
from the state lotteries fund; however, by 1990, out of the 97 concluded cases
under the scheme, 95 were successful and there was a surplus of HK$1,000,000 in
1990: see Zindel, above n. 1 at 297. Northern Ireland has also set up a
Contingency Legal Aid Fund: see D. Capper, ‘The Contingency Legal Aid Fund:
A Third Way To Finance Personal Injury Litigation’ (2003) 30 Journal of Law and
Society 66.
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contributions of ‘success fees’ paid into the Legal Aid Fund. Whilst
this ‘hybrid’ system results in enhanced access to justice, there are
potential problems. It puts added pressure on the Legal Aid Bureau to
win the cases to sustain the state ‘coffers’ and in this regard, the
unaided opposing party may be forgiven for thinking that he or she
has taken up arms not merely against the aided litigant but against the
government as well! Further, if the aided litigant were to lose the case,
the Legal Aid Bureau does not bear the financial burden of the aided
litigant to pay damages to the winning party; hence, it appears non-
reciprocal as between the Legal Aid Bureau and the aided litigant if
the latter is required to pay a portion of the damages to the Legal Aid
Bureau if he or she wins the case under the ‘hybrid’ system. However,
it may be argued that notwithstanding this problem of non-
reciprocity, the overall position of the aided person would have been
enhanced under the ‘hybrid’ system since he or she would not have
been eligible for legal aid in the first place under the current legal aid
system.
iii. Conditional Fees and Professional Ethics
The main public policy reasons against conditional fee agreements
can be conveniently summarized under two primary headings:
1. conditional fee agreements give rise to conflicts of interest be-
tween the lawyer and the client as the lawyer is potentially
tainted by financial interest in the outcome of the client’s case
(‘Duty to Client’); and
2. under a conditional fee agreement, the lawyer may be moti-
vated to act in a manner inconsistent with his or her duties to
the court (‘Duty to Court’).102
First, under a conditional fee based system, as the fee payable is
conditional upon the outcome of the case, it may be argued, from the
outset, that the financial interest of the lawyer in the case is more
closely aligned with that of the client103 compared with that under the
present regime. Moreover, it is submitted that the ‘Duty to Client’ and
‘Duty to Court’ arguments are unfounded or at least exaggerated. Let
us assume for instance that the lawyer is representing himself or
herself in his or her own case claiming legal rights to a piece of
property. The stakes are clearly higher for the lawyer fighting his or
her own case than if he or she were merely representing a client
claiming rights to that property under a conditional fee agreement.
Yet, most of us are unlikely to suspect that the lawyer claiming rights
to the property alleged to belong to him or her would be actuated by
improper motives with respect to the litigation. By the same token, it
102 See A. Walters, ‘Conditional Fee Arrangements At Common Law’ (2000) 116 LQR
371.
103 See also A. Boon and J. Levin, The Ethics and Conduct of Lawyers in England and
Wales (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 1999) 287.
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would be inappropriate to suggest that the conditional fees lawyer
representing his or her client would be actuated by improper motives
in conflict with the client’s interests or duties to the court.
Perhaps it is incorrect to compare a lawyer litigating his or her own
case and one representing a client under a conditional fee agreement.
It may be argued that this is not comparing ‘apples with apples’ for, in
the former case, there is no lawyer-client relationship in the first
place. It may be more appropriate, then, to compare a conditional fees
lawyer with a lawyer acting for his or her client under the present
regime based on hourly charges. Under the latter arrangement, the
fees agreed to be paid are dependent on the amount and complexity
of work done by the lawyer, typically based on an hourly charge
(which amount usually varies with the seniority and experience of the
lawyer). Short of negligent handling of the litigation resulting in the
client losing the case, the lawyer will receive the same amount of fees
based on hourly charges as he or she would if the client had won the
case. In such a situation, there is no direct and close alignment of
the financial interest of the lawyer and the client’s interest in ‘winning’
the case as the lawyer will still be paid the agreed legal fees based on
the hours clocked up, whatever the outcome of the case. Apart from
the temptation for lawyers to bill more hours than the actual work
done, Luban104 also raised the spectre of clients ‘subsidizing’ the
learning opportunities of lawyers who lack adequate expertise on
particular cases. Thus, although the lawyer under the present regime
may still be affected financially (albeit indirectly) by the outcome of the
case (for example, diminished reputation),105 in the final analysis, how-
ever, there is a sufficient basis for submitting that there is a closer
alignment of direct financial interests between the lawyer and the
client under a conditional fee agreement, though in varying degrees.
Under the speculative as well as conditional uplift model, the success
fee chargeable is still based (albeit in part) on the normal hourly
charges payable, unlike in an American-style contingency fee model.
Hence, it is recognized that the United Kingdom and Australian con-
ditional fee model is not entirely free from the drawbacks of the
hourly charge system under the present regime.
Secondly, there is no real concern that conditional fees lawyers
would be able to earn more with less effort (compared with lawyers
under the present regime) if the case is settled at an early stage.
Though it is recognized that the lawyers may pocket high success fees
104 Luban, above n. 17 at 118.
105 Millet LJ remarked in Thai Trading Co (a firm) v Taylor, above n. 29 at 73, in the
context of a conditional normal fee agreement, that the solicitor who acts for a
multinational company in a heavy commercial action knows that if he loses the
case his client may take his business elsewhere.
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in some cases due to early settlements, there is no evidence that this is
the norm.106 Some reasons are advanced as follows:
1. The client can circumvent this by agreeing with his or her law-
yer on a two-stage (or, for that matter, a multiple-stage) success
fee,107 whereby a rebate on the success fee is discounted from
the sum payable by the client to the lawyer if the litigation is
settled at an earlier stage stipulated in the conditional fee agree-
ment. This means that if the case is settled earlier, the lawyer is
paid less. Each of the stages may correspond with the varying
rebate amounts as a rough estimate of the amount of time and
effort which would have been expended by the lawyer at that
relevant stage(s) of the proceedings.
2. One has to see the issue in the larger context. In the event that
the case is proceeded with to trial and the client eventually loses
the case, there would not be any payment for the vast amounts
of time and effort put in by the lawyer on behalf of the client.
3. The lawyer should be ‘rewarded’ for his or her ability to facili-
tate the settlement at an early stage of the proceedings and this
is consistent with the alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
movement in Singapore to encourage settlements.108
Thirdly, it is submitted that conditional fees do not unduly encourage
lawyers to lay their hands on the fees more quickly. The concern is
that in a conditional fee based system, as clients do not need to pay
monies to their lawyers upfront or before the case is won, lawyers
may be tempted to expedite the proceedings ‘unduly’ to achieve a
successful resolution so as to obtain the success fee more quickly.
There is no problem with lawyers being motivated to expedite the
case to begin with; in fact, one might consider that to be laudable and
consistent with the aim of improving efficiency in the litigation pro-
cess in line with the Singapore judiciary’s objective. Moreover, the
discerning lawyer would realize that his or her desire to expedite
proceedings would be constrained by the preparation work required
(including the time needed to garner proper evidence) so that he or
she can achieve a desired outcome. Further, as part of the judiciary’s
case management system, existing court schedules in Singapore are
already fairly tight.109
106 See e.g. S.D. Annand and R.F. Green, ‘Legislative and Judicial Controls of
Contingency Fees in Tort Cases’ (1996) 99 West Virginia Law Review 81 at 87–8.
107 The English Court of Appeal in Callery v Gray, above n. 92 at 885 remarked that
this two-stage success fee process allows parties to consider the merits of the
claim during the protocol period and is also in accordance with the Civil
Procedure Rules initiated by Lord Woolf.
108 See iv below for a discussion of the Singapore ADR movement and conditional
fees.
109 See e.g. Chief Justice’s speech, ‘Opening of Legal Year 2002’, 5 January 2002 at
http://www.supcourt.gov.sg on the case management regime in the subordinate
courts and the need for lawyers to cooperate with the courts towards a just,
expeditious and economic disposal of the cases.
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Whilst the writer is aware of the argument that a lawyer operating
under a conditional fee agreement may be relatively more ‘incentiv-
ized’ in ensuring that the client’s interests (read: lawyer’s interests) are
advanced, it is submitted that the possible moral frailty of lawyers in
the face of temptation cannot be reason enough to override the public
interest for access to justice. Moreover, even if it is true that lawyers
would more likely be tempted to compromise their professional in-
tegrity if they were acting for clients under conditional fee agree-
ments, it is submitted that there are sufficient safeguards110 within the
existing system to deter the lawyers from falling into such temptation.
However, no one can vouchsafe that all conditional fees lawyers will
be beyond reproach in the face of temptation, just as no one can
guarantee the professional integrity of all lawyers under the present
regime. Nevertheless, the legal profession is expected to act with in-
tegrity in the interests of clients and there are existing rules to ensure
that the legal profession as a whole maintains that professional
integrity.
Some illustrations of the existing safeguards (and their related con-
cerns) will suffice here. First, there is imposed on the lawyer the duty
to discharge himself or herself or withdraw from a case where his or
her interests conflict with those of the client.111 A difficult issue,
though, arises upon such discharge or withdrawal: whether the law-
yer acting under a conditional fee agreement should be entitled to
some form of remuneration for work done up to the point of the
discharge or withdrawal, or would any payment depend on the suc-
cessful outcome of the litigation in accordance with the terms of the
conditional fee agreement? Brickman has proposed, in the context of
the United States, that a quantum meruit should be paid to the lawyer
only upon the successful outcome of the litigation and that the per-
centage stated in the contingency fee agreement should be the limit of
the lawyer’s fees.112 This proposal has the merit of allowing the parties
to adhere to the contract they have entered into, prevents the client
profiting from a ‘last minute’ discharge of the lawyer to avoid paying
fees and, at the same time, does not undermine the client’s legal rights
to discharge the lawyer without cause. Whilst substantially in agree-
ment with the proposal, an academic from the United Kingdom ex-
pressed a concern, however, with the ‘unfairness’ that may result if
the remuneration of the discharged lawyer is dependent on the work
110 These safeguards are backed by sanctions (e.g. disciplinary control by the
Supreme Court) pursuant to the Legal Profession Act (see e.g. s. 83) as well as the
Singapore Professional Conduct Rules. See Re Chan Chow Wang [1982–3] SLR
413 in the context of a reinstatement application by a lawyer who was struck off
the rolls for entering into a champertous agreement.
111 Singapore Professional Conduct Rules, r. 26.
112 See L. Brickman, ‘Setting the fee when the client discharges a contingency fee
attorney’ (1993) 2 Emory LJ 367.
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of the subsequently retained lawyer.113 In this regard, it is suggested
that if there has been a change of lawyer mid-stream, the client, the
discharged and the newly retained lawyer should be encouraged to
enter into an agreement on, inter alia, the sharing of the success fees
in an agreed proportion as between the lawyers.114
Secondly, there are pre-existing safeguards against overcharging
of fees generally.115 The concern that the lawyer may take advantage
of the client by exaggerating the risks involved in the case (so as to
charge a higher success fee than would be justifiable) is ameliorated
in a situation of free market competition, where the client is free to
engage another lawyer who stipulates a lower ‘success fee’. Yet the
writer is aware of the possible tendency of contingency fees lawyers
as in the US to administer a standard percentage in most cases and
the lower bargaining power of the client vis-a`-vis the lawyer in this
respect,116 as well as specific complaints in Canada with regard to the
high percentages charged by lawyers.117 There is thus a need for
safeguards (apart from free market mechanisms) to protect the client.
These can be in the form of supervision or determination of the
appropriate fee by the Singapore courts on the grounds of fairness
and reasonableness.118 In South Australia, for example, the Legal
Practitioners Act permits contingency fees subject to the power of the
court to rescind or vary if the terms of such an agreement are not fair
and reasonable. If deemed necessary, the maximum allowable uplift or
the percentage can be legislated, as in the United Kingdom, Ontario
(Canada)119 and Australia.120 To ameliorate any rigidity that may result
from fixing a maximum premium or percentage, parties may be al-
lowed to agree on a premium or percentage beyond the maximum, as
contained in the Ontario legislation, subject to the court’s approval
113 See G. Marshall, ‘Quantum meruit and Conditional Fees: An overlooked issue?’
(2001) 20 CJQ 258.
114 The legal expenses insurers (if any) would probably need to be notified (if not
consulted) in the event of a change of lawyers.
115 The aggrieved client can complain to the Law Society of Singapore in respect of
overcharging by his lawyers under the present regime: see Re Abdul Rahim
Rajudin [1989] 1 Malayan Law Journal 289.
116 See Annand and Green, above n. 106 at 86–8.
117 See J.L. Llewellyn, ‘Dealing with the Legacy of Native Residential School Abuse in
Canada: Litigation, ADR and Restorative Justice’ (2002) 52 U Toronto LJ 253 at
268–9.
118 See Re Stuart [1893] 2 QB 201 at 204–5. See also the Malaysian High Court case of
Shamsudin bin Embun v P T Seah & Co [1988] 2 Malayan Law Journal 546: the
onus is on the lawyer (not the client) to prove its fairness and reasonableness.
119 Ontario Justice Statute Law Amendment Act 2002, sch. A, para. 4. The Lieutenant
Governor in Council may make regulations setting a scale for the maximum
percentage that may be charged for a contingency fee.
120 The Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) and Legal Practice Bill 1996 (Vic) stipulate
that the uplift on the costs payable in the event of a successful outcome cannot
exceed 25 per cent of those costs. The Queensland Barristers’ Rules allow
barristers to charge up to a maximum of 50 per cent of the usual fee. In South
Australia, the corresponding limit is double the normal fees chargeable by the
lawyer (Professional Conduct Rules, r. 8.10 and Legal Practitioners Act 1981,
s. 42(6)(c)).
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upon parties’ application.121 Possible guidance outside the legislative
sphere may also be sought from the court’s assessment of the success
fees payable.122 It is realized that, during the initial stages of imple-
mentation, the determination of the appropriate success fee or per-
centage may be difficult (and controversial) due to the lack of
precedents and data relevant to Singapore, as experienced by the
English Court of Appeal in Callery.123 The determination of the appro-
priate premiums may not always be based on invariable and purely
quantitative factors124 but, as the reader would be aware, neither is
the computation of common law damages by the courts. It is believed,
however, that the uncertainty (and, for that matter, litigation relating
to premiums) can be reduced over time if the bases for the determina-
tion of the success fee are discussed and reviewed amongst the
courts, insurance industry, lawyers, members of the public and so on,
prior to and during any implementation of conditional fees in
Singapore.
Thirdly, the courts can prevent abuse of process in their inherent
jurisdiction as well as under the wasted costs jurisdiction under the
Rules of Court. This has already been discussed above.
Fourthly, to reduce the likelihood of lawyers taking advantage of
the client in conditional fee arrangements, Parliament could enact
legislation stipulating the requirements of a valid and enforceable
conditional fee agreement. The US Code and Rules respectively
require the method of fee determination (including agreements on the
percentage fee, litigation and other expenses to be deducted, etc.) to
be specified in writing.125 The United Kingdom legislation and regula-
tions mandate the obligation of the lawyer to inform and explain the
risks involved and the liabilities of the client to make payments of fees
121 See the Justice Statute Law Amendment Act 2002, sch. A, para. 4.
122 See Callery v Gray, above n. 92 at 881 on the factors relating to the solicitors’
‘experience of the work done and the likelihood of success or failure of the
particular class of litigation’.
123 Ibid. at 884. In the subsequent case of Halloran v Delaney [2002] EWCA Civ 1258,
Brooke LJ, relying on Woolf LJ’s judgment in Callery v Gray which was endorsed
by the House of Lords, indicated that for simple claims settled without need for
proceedings, judges should ordinarily decide to allow an uplift of 5 per cent on
claimants’ lawyers’ costs (including in respect of costs-only proceedings in the
United Kingdom), but this can be departed from in special circumstances; for
criticisms of the 5 per cent rule as being too low to be viable, see M. Zander,
‘Where Are We Heading With the Funding of Civil Litigation?’ (2003) 22 CLQ 23
at 30. Subsequently, in Re Claims Direct Test Cases [2003] EWCA Civ 136, Brooke
LJ clarified that the 5 per cent rule applies to cases where prospects of success are
virtually 100 per cent.
124 Risk assessment may depend on the certainty of the particular area of law(s) in
question in the litigation proceedings: see M. Clarke, Policies and Perceptions of
Insurance: An Introduction to Insurance Law (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1997) 40–1.
125 See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, r. 2–106(d) and Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, r. 1.5(c).
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or disbursements to the lawyer,126 but this assumes that the con-
ditional fee structure and terms are not too complex for the layperson.
Protection for the client could be reinforced by instituting, as in
Australia, a ‘cooling off period’ for the client to terminate the con-
ditional fee agreement, if he or she so desires.127 Another form of
regulation could be in respect of stipulating the types of proceedings
amenable to the conditional fees system. In most jurisdictions (includ-
ing the United States, United Kingdom and Australia), criminal and
matrimonial proceedings are excluded from the conditional fees sys-
tem due to public policy concerns.128
iv. Conditional Fees and Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR)129
The current prohibition against conditional fees is targeted at such
agreements entered into in respect of contentious proceedings. Under
the Legal Profession Act, ‘contentious business’ is defined as ‘business
done, whether as solicitor or as advocate, in or for the purposes of
proceedings begun before a court of justice or before an arbitrator’.130
It is submitted that the term ‘contentious proceedings’ should be sim-
ilarly construed.131
It is suggested that the proposal for a conditional fee based system
is not meant to, and its implementation would not, supplant or dilute
other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as mediation
and negotiation (and their variants).132 The concern that conditional
fees will necessarily lead to undesirable litigiousness is unfounded.
The conditional fee system can co-exist with and complement the
126 The Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000 (SI 2000/692). It is still possible,
however, that a reasonable risk assessment made prior to or at the time of the
execution of the conditional fee agreement may appear unjustified with the
benefit of hindsight or due to a change of circumstances. But such a situation can
also occur in respect of fee estimates and caps in normal fee agreements under
the present regime.
127 See, for example, South Australia’s Professional Conduct Rules, r. 8.10(a)(ii).
128 Public policy arguments for the exclusion of criminal proceedings from the ambit
of conditional fees include: (a) the consequences of a lawyer being tainted by his
or her financial interest in his or her conditional fee client are more serious in a
criminal matter than in a civil matter as the former impinges on one’s liberty and
life; (b) there is usually no monetary compensation recovered by an acquitted
person in criminal proceedings; and (c) the bargaining power of an accused is
likely to be relatively lower vis-à-vis a claimant in civil proceedings. It is also
against public policy, in the context of matrimonial proceedings, to provide
financial incentives via conditional fee agreements to a lawyer to discourage
reconciliation: see Tokeley, above n. 1 at 24–5.
129 See generally, T.B.J. Lee, ‘The ADR Movement in Singapore’ in Tan (ed.), above
n. 7 at 414–45. Lee referred to ‘ADR’ as ‘Appropriate Dispute Resolution’ on the
basis that it more accurately brings across the idea that lawyers engage in many
different forms of dispute resolution and, at any point in time, one form may be
more ‘appropriate’ than another.
130 Legal Profession Act, s. 2.
131 See also Bevan Ashford v Geoff Yeandle (Contractors) Ltd (in liquidation) [1998]
3 WLR 172 at 182.
132 Variants such as Med-Arb, Neg-Med and Mini-Trial; see Lee, above n. 129.
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ADR movement in Singapore.133 Existing court practice134 requiring
lawyers to inform and advise clients of the option of using mediation
or ADR may be maintained alongside the conditional fee system. One
of the avowed aims of ADR is to reduce legal costs for the disputing
parties and such an objective is not inconsistent with the proposal for
conditional fees.135
Conditional fee agreements can accommodate various variations.
They may, for instance, stipulate that the payment of the success fee
be triggered by the recovery of a specified sum of money by the client
in a case, whether by way of a court order mandating such recovery
or via an out-of-court settlement through ADR mechanisms such as
negotiation or mediation. In this way, the ADR processes are in-built
within the conditional fee system. Under a carefully thought out two-
stage (or multiple-stage) agreement, it is also possible to structure the
payment of success fees to encourage settlement of the case at an
earlier stage of the proceedings instead of either commencing an
action in the courts or bringing the claim to the trial stage when the
costs would have escalated. It is noted that contingency fee agree-
ments in the United States typically provide for a standard percentage
fee if the claim is settled without action and increased percentages
where the action is filed or if the case goes to trial.136
We also need to address the concern that conditional fee agree-
ments may discourage lawyers from facilitating the settlement of a
case due to divergence of interests of the lawyer vis-a`-vis the client,137
which it is suggested may be somewhat exaggerated. The conditional
fee agreement may stipulate that the success fee will be paid if, say,
$100,000 is recovered on behalf of the client, whether by way of a
court order stipulating such recovery or via a binding agreement
signed by parties pursuant to third party mediation or negotiation.
The objection which may be raised here is that the lawyer may be
133 See L. Boulle and H.H. Teh, Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice (Butterworths
Asia: Singapore, 2000) 198–213 on the mediation movement in Singapore. Whilst
it is recognized that there may be arguments against the ADR movement in
Singapore, the ADR movement has gained so much momentum that one would
have to ignore its present-day significance in Singapore at one’s peril; for a good
overview of the issues relating to the need for regulation of mediation in
Singapore, see Law Reform and Revision Division, Attorney-General’s Chambers,
Singapore, Need for Mediation Laws?, LRRD No. 5/2001.
134 Subordinate Courts Practice Directions (1999 edn), para. 25(5), Practice Direction
No. 1.
135 Factors which determine the appropriateness of a particular dispute resolution
process include the significance of privacy and confidentiality, cultural norms,
expertise and neutrality of the third party decision-makers, costs involved,
preserving relationships between disputing parties and so on. The purpose of this
Part of the paper is not to assess the comparative advantages of litigation vis-a`-vis
ADR. Suffice it to say that it would be naïve to assume that all disputes can be
handled by out-of-court mediation and negotiation just as it is to suppose that all
disputes should be resolved by the Singapore courts.
136 Brickman, above n. 71 at 287.
137 See e.g. in the context of the US, H.M. Kritzer, ‘Seven Dogged Myths Concerning
Contingency Fees’ (2002) 80 Wash U LQ 739 at 774–6.
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discouraged from entering into any settlement agreement where the
amount recovered is below $100,000 as, in that event, he or she will
not be paid any fees by his or her client. However, it is suggested that
this overlooks the fact that the lawyer would have arrived at this
figure of $100,000 after evaluating the risks involved and the chances
of securing recovery of that amount on behalf of the client based on
his or her experience and legal knowledge.
Moreover, it is open to the lawyer and the client to agree on a
graduated scale or range of recovery amounts, depending on assess-
ment of the risks and chances of recovering $100,000 or more. The
conditional fee agreement should be sufficiently flexible to accom-
modate the degrees of risks involved. For instance, if the lawyer is not
entirely confident of recovering $100,000 and thinks it reasonable
from his or her experience that the client would be able to recover a
little less than $100,000, it may be stipulated in the conditional fee
agreement that for the recovery of amounts ranging from $70,000 to
$99,999, the lawyer will also receive a success fee, albeit slightly lower
than that if the amount recovered were $100,000 or more. The lower
success fee payable at the stage of a mediated or negotiated settle-
ment prior to trial would likely be arrived at based on the assessment
of the lawyer as to the appropriate amount of time and effort which
would be expended at that relevant stage. The graduated scale of fees
payable in the conditional fee agreement would lessen the impact of
the lawyer ‘missing the mark’ in terms of assessment of risks, without
prejudicing the objective of settlement.
Under a conditional fee agreement, the lawyer bears the legal risks
and would have to assess the merits (and corresponding risks) of the
client’s claim or defence before deciding to take up the case. This will,
in all likelihood, prompt the lawyer to be better prepared before the
commencement of the client’s case by the issue of the originating
process in the courts. This is consistent with the judiciary’s call to
shorten the time period from the commencement of a case to its
eventual judgment (or settlement).138
Let us now examine the issue from the client’s perspective with
regard to litigation costs. Will conditional fee agreements discourage
the client, in the midst of contentious proceedings, from settlement?
This will depend again on how the conditional fee agreement is struc-
tured. If the conditional fee agreement provides for payment of a
graduated scale of ‘success fees’, it may benefit the litigant to settle for
lower compensation (than was originally claimed) if he or she can
save monies by paying a lower ‘success fee’ to his or her lawyer, not
to mention avoiding a prolonged litigation and suffering the prospect
of not obtaining any compensation at all at the end of a gruelling
court trial. A fortiori, if the same litigant is not required to pay any
‘success fee’ for settlement at the lower compensation under an ‘un-
138 See generally Lim and Liew, above n. 61 at ch. 2.
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 graduated’ conditional fee agreement, he or she may actually be more
encouraged to settle at that compensation amount.
Another question arises: assuming that contentious proceedings
have not commenced, would the prospect of entering into a condi-
tional fee agreement encourage a client, in terms of the costs factor
only, to start proceedings in the courts or arbitration at the expense of
negotiation or mediation processes? First, it is recognized that if the
litigant is ‘freed’ of litigation costs entirely under a conditional fee
based system, he or she may be more encouraged to pursue litigation
and arbitration at the expense of negotiation and mediation.139 This
relates to the Callery debate mentioned above as to what extent the
conditional fee based system should remove litigation costs for the
potential litigant. Whilst it is recognized that one of the important
objectives of conditional fees is to enhance access to justice, it is
suggested that litigation costs should not be removed entirely. Indeed,
it has been suggested that the absence of a ‘loser pays’ costs rule in
the US has in part resulted in irresponsible litigation.140 Subject to
further data collection and study on the relative costs of litigation and
mediation, it is tentatively suggested that the litigant should pay dis-
bursements to his or her lawyer as well as the insurance premiums to
the insurer (where applicable). No doubt the premiums will be set by
the market and/or regulators, though the writer understands that
prohibitive premiums141 (as in the United Kingdom for certain types of
claims) can result in a disincentive to litigate. If it can be demonstrated
that the litigant would be hard-pressed based on his or her extreme
financial hardship to pay the disbursements and/or insurance pre-
miums, it has already been suggested that the Legal Aid Bureau can
and should play a useful role in alleviating that financial hardship. The
underlying principle to bear in mind is that the introduction of condi-
tional fees should not ‘unduly’ motivate disputing parties to litigate or
arbitrate at the expense of mediation and negotiation, where the latter
are more appropriate processes to deal with the dispute at hand based
on a holistic assessment.
III. Conclusion
The core thesis of this paper is that there are good public policy
reasons to re-examine the current position in Singapore prohibiting
139 The overall incentives available to encourage mediation and negotiation will need
to be weighed against the benefits of litigation or arbitration under a conditional
fee agreement; see e.g. waivers for court hearing fees to parties who have
attempted mediation but were unsuccessful in reaching settlement: Supreme
Court Registrar’s Circular No. 4 of 1997 and Subordinate Courts’ Registrar’s
Circular No. 1 of 1997.
140 See C. Crier, The Case Against Lawyers (Broadway Books: New York, 2002) 187–8.
141 See M. Zander, ‘Will the Revolution in the Funding of Civil Litigation in England
Eventually Lead to Contingency Fees?’ (2003) 52 DePaul L Rev 259 at 280.
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conditional fee agreements. It has also argued how some of the per-
ceived objections and concerns about conditional fees may be un-
founded or exaggerated when applied to the Singapore context.
However, any steps to implement conditional fees in Singapore
should be taken only after careful consideration of the various issues
involved as well as the likely impact on the legal profession, the
courts, the insurance industry, the Legal Aid Bureau and members of
the public. Further market research, collection of data and consulta-
tions amongst interested parties are required to ascertain if the pro-
posals will indeed advance Singapore’s overall public interests (after
taking into consideration the costs, administrative or otherwise, re-
quired in order to implement the new system). It is hoped that this
essay has done part of the groundwork for these further—and highly
important—investigations.
There are a few broad-based issues which should be considered
from the outset if Singapore should decide to adopt conditional fees.
The first relates to whether we should adopt the American-style
Model 3 contingency fee agreement in Singapore or merely the more
limited Models 1 and 2 conditional fee agreements as currently prac-
tised in the United Kingdom and Australia. There is a concern that the
prospect of obtaining a percentage of the recovered amount in litiga-
tion (Model 3) may constitute a greater temptation for the lawyer than
under the Models 1 and 2 conditional fee agreements. Another con-
cern is that the percentage stipulated may not correspond to (or
worse, be inconsistent with) the actual amount of time and effort
expended by the lawyer in monetary terms. Moreover, the United
States does not operate according to the ‘costs follow the event’ prin-
ciple whereby, in Singapore, the losing party pays the legal costs of
the winning party. These concerns merit further study but the follow-
ing are some tentative reasons why American-style contingency fees
should not be brushed aside too quickly. First, it is conceivable (at
least mathematically) that the success fee under the American model
may well be less than that under the United Kingdom or Australian
models. Secondly, the concerns may be alleviated by legislating a cap
on the fee percentage of the amount recoverable under the American-
style contingency fee system. Thirdly, unlike in the United Kingdom
(and, for that matter, the United States), assessment of damages is
decided by the judges in Singapore. Hence, the concern that juries
may inflate the damages recoverable (in particular, the expansion of
punitive damages awards in the United States142) which in turn im-
pacts on the ‘success fee’ under a contingency fee agreement is not a
genuine problem in Singapore.143 Lastly, the American model ensures
142 See Brickman, above n. 71 at 277–8.
143 It has been noted that the jury in the United States recognizes that a substantial
part of the damages may be recovered by the lawyer and hence compensate by
increasing the amount of the award; see P.A. Thomas, ‘Contingency Fees: A Case
Study For Malaysia’ (1978) 5 Journal of Malaysian and Comparative Law 45 at 55.
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greater proportionality between the success fee chargeable and the
damages recoverable in an action compared with the United Kingdom
and Australian models.
The alternative proposal of a hybrid between the conditional fee
based system and legal aid needs to be explored in greater detail. The
thrust of that exploration should be, in my view, to find a compromise
which perhaps avoids some of the perceived weaknesses under a pure
conditional fees system (for example, greater temptation for lawyers
to compromise professional integrity) as well as the disadvantages
under the current legal aid regime (for example, unfair costs indem-
nity principle against unaided person and dissatisfaction with means
test, etc.). At the same time, we should attempt to capitalize on some
of the strengths and advantages of conditional fees as discussed in
this paper.
One suggested strategy might be to permit conditional fees in
stages or in a piecemeal fashion based on specific types of proceed-
ings or matters (such as personal injury claims, inheritance claims or
summary-type proceedings for a simple debt) as part of a pilot project
or trial. This would allow the system to be tested and fine-tuned if
necessary.144 It is neither possible nor practicable, from the outset, to
design a comprehensive conditional fee system for implementation in
Singapore. The issues surrounding conditional fees are complex and
wide ranging. One suspects that as the system evolves, the legal prac-
titioners, courts, insurance professionals as well as other relevant
participants would have to try to learn from their experiences (inevit-
ably) through trial and error, as well as to draw lessons from the
experiences of those countries which have trodden that path, with a
view to resolving the initial teething problems.
Finally, if conditional fees do ‘take root’ in Singapore, there should
be adequate publicity of the system to ensure that the general public
are aware of the existence of and their rights under the conditional fee
based system (or any appropriate variant). As one of the main objec-
tives of conditional fees is enhanced public access to justice, it is
paramount that the general public be adequately informed of the legal
reforms, before they are implemented in Singapore.
144 A law academic and a researcher have noted that the speedy move from legal aid
to conditional fees for personal injury cases in the United Kingdom was a ‘bold
and potentially hazardous step’; see R. White and R. Atkinson, ‘Personal Injury
Litigation, Conditional Fees and After-The-Event Insurance’ (2000) 19 CJQ 118 at
131.
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